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The Republic of Serbia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to implement a
program-oriented, multi-year budgeting system in 2010. This paper reveals several
challenges that threaten the success of this initiative. First, we find that the
proposed budget system confuses organizations and programs. Second, there does
not appear to be a centrally coordinated effort to implement program budgeting,
leading to significant disparities in comprehension, organization, and
implementation amongst the subordinate commands in MoD. Finally, there is a
distinct lack of communication within the MoD regarding the necessity of a
program budget and how the process should move forward. These issues inhibit
the implementation of program budgeting in the MoD and diminish the possible
gains associated with the multi-year, programmatic allocation of defense resources.
INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Serbia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) is currently planning to implement
a Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Execution (PPBE) system in 2010. The impetus for
the implementation of a program budgeting in the MoD appears to have begun in 2003
with the discussion of the transition from the cash-accounting, Soviet-legacy budget
system to a multi-year, program-oriented budget system. The intent to implement pro-
gram budgeting became significant with the development of initial plans and programs in
2008 and the designation of the MoD as one of the pilot ministries for the government-
wide introduction of program budgeting.
A flawed implementation could have national and international ramifications given
the importance of the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) in the Balkans region and the
observed need to realign the SAF to the MoD’s strategic goals. With the Serbian Min-
istry of Finance’s (MoF) development of a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
(MTEF), the Government of the Republic of Serbia (GoRS) is clearly attempting to
adopt internationally accepted norms in the area of public financial management. The
Naval Postgraduate School, Global Public Policy Academic Group, 699 Dyer Road, Bldg 234, Monterey,
CA 93943. He can be reached at rmmcnab@nps.edu.
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MoF, for example, has issued medium-term macroeconomic projections for 2010–2012
and has established ministerial expenditure ceilings for this period. The MoF has
also stated a clear intent to move ahead with the implementation of program budgeting,
with the express desire of linking expenditures to desired outcomes. The MoF views
the shift as necessary due to the increasing impact of globalization on the Serbian
economy and the need to bring transparency and accountability to the use of public
funds. As one of the lead ministries in this effort, the success (or failure) of budget reform
in the MoD is likely to influence the implementation of program budgeting across
the GoRS. Furthermore, given the need to shift resources and personnel, the effort to
implement program budgeting will undoubtedly redistribute scarce resources within
the MoD, influencing the effort to modernize the SAF. The question of whether program
budget reform is likely to succeed therefore is of concern to policymakers and
practitioners alike.
This paper evaluates the Serbian MoD ’s effort to implement program budgeting. We
argue that the current state of program budgeting in the SAF appears to be significantly
flawed in several areas, suggesting that the benefits normally promised from implement-
ing program budgeting may not occur in the Serbian case. First, we find that the pro-
posed budget system confuses organizations and programs. Second, there does not
appear to be a centrally coordinated effort to implement program budgeting; this leads
to significant disparities in comprehension, organization, and implementation amongst
the subordinate commands in the MoD. Finally, there is a distinct lack of communi-
cation amongst the MoD members regarding the necessity of a program budget and how
the process should move forward. We argue that these issues may inhibit the imple-
mentation of program budgeting in the MoD and detract from the possible gains
associated with the multi-year, programmatic allocation of defense resources.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly discusses
the political and economic climate driving the implementation of program budgeting in
the Serbian MoD. The third section examines the debate in the literature as to the
appropriate basis for a program structure. The fourth section analyzes the strategic
framework for program budgeting implementation and investigates whether the program
budgeting system’s design reflects the MoD’s strategic goals. The fifth section compares
the Serbian case with the implementation of program budgeting in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina MoD. The final section considers the prospects for an effective implementation
of program budgeting in the MoD and concludes with recommendations to improve the
prospects for success.
THE CLIMATE FOR BUDGET REFORM IN SERBIA
To place the Serbian MoD’s implementation of program budgeting in context, it is
important to first briefly review the political and macroeconomic environment in the
Republic of Serbia. First, unlike the United States and other developed countries, Serbia
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does not have an established history of democratic governance. Transparency and
accountability remain weak, although progress in these areas is a priority of the current
government. Second, while the implementation of program budgeting in the United
States occurred in a relatively stable political and economic climate, uncertainty and
instability characterizes the Serbian macroeconomic environment.1 Third, questions of
Kosovo’s independence continue to shape political and economic policy, directly affect-
ing the prospects for reform.
The Political Climate for Program Budget Reform in Serbia
The political challenge for reform in Serbia is significant as it is simultaneously under-
going four major transitions: post-communist/authoritarian political reforms, economic
transition, post-conflict recovery, and an attempt to further integrate into the European
Union.2 The legacy of the Milosevic regime, coupled with the unresolved issue of Ko-
sovo, impedes reform efforts and complicates relations with its neighbors. This section
briefly reviews the political climate in Serbia with regards to the proposed budgeting
reforms in the MoD.
Democratic governance is a relatively new phenomenon to Serbia; following the
President Slobodan Milosevic resignation in September 2000, the first democratically
elected government formed in January 2001. Voters approved replacement of the dated
Socialist-era constitution with a new, democratically oriented constitution in 2006. The
2006 constitution, however, explicitly states in the preamble that Kosovo is ‘‘an integral
part of the territory of Serbia.’’3 In the most recent elections in 2008, Serbian voters
narrowly reelected President Boris Tadic of the pro-Western Democratic Party in a run-
off, beating ultranationalist Tomislav Nikolic.4 Current Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic
is also a member of the Democratic Party. As such, the current government’s security
policy has focused on two main goalsFintegration with the European Union and hin-
dering international recognition of Serbia’s former Kosovo province.
An inherent political tension exists between these two goals. The first goal seeks to
further integrate Serbia into Europe; the second attempts to thwart Kosovo’s indepen-
dence by opposing European foreign policy. A latent Albanian separatist movement in
1. There have been several attempts at explaining post-communist divergence based on legacies in
economic, political or cultural structures, see H. Kitschelt, ‘‘After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative
Lessons of Transitions,’’ Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (2005): 674–675; H. Kitschelt and E. Malesky,
Constitutional design and post-Communist economic reform. Presented at Midwest Political Science
Conference. Chicago, IL, 2000; J. Mller, Post-communist regime change: a comparative study (London:
Routledge, 2009) for a discussion.
2. A. Watkins, Security sector reform and donor assistance in Serbia 2000-2010 (Brussels: Initiative for
Peacebuilding, 2010). Available from: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Serbia_Report_Feb.pdf.
3. For the full text of the 2006 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. Available from: http://
www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php?change_lang=en: accessed 2 August 2010.
4. S. Woehrel, Serbia: Current issues and policy. Congressional Research Service Report 7-5700
RS22601 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010).
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the Presevo Valley region further complicates the Kosovo question.5 This tension is reflected,
in part, in a revisionist campaign where Serbia portrays itself as a victim of the ‘‘West.’’6 The
rampant corruption of the Milosovec regime also continues to haunt the political process in
Serbia. Respondents to a recent survey on perceptions of corruption in Serbia stated that
political parties are those most affected by corruption and that the government’s anti-cor-
ruption campaign is largely ineffective.7 Political inequality and its attendant rent-seeking
behavior have also distorted growth and contributed to political instability.8
The GoRS national security policies reflect the disagreement between the external and
internal goals of Serbia. Serbia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in
2006 and, some suggest, aspires to ascend to NATO membership status (along with most
of the countries in the region). The MoD also adopted the Strategic Defense Review
(SDR) in 2006, providing organizational guidance on the MoD’s reform through 2015.
The Serbian Parliament, on the other hand, did not pass the National Security Strategy
(NSS) and Defense Strategy (DS) until October 2009. The discussion of whether Kosovo
was a strategic challenge to Serbia, in part, delayed the passage of these strategy doc-
uments. This led to the somewhat curious situation where Parliament passed two laws in
December 2007 (the Law on Defense and the Law on the Armed Forces of Serbia), which
the NSS and DS should have been preceded.9 In other words, documents relying on the
NSS and DS were passed into law before the NSS and DS. This continues to be a
pressing issue in that, at the time of writing, senior members of the Serbian government
continue to insist that Serbia will not accept the ‘‘self-proclaimed independence’’ of
Kosovo.10 As we discuss later in this paper, the national security guidance of the Serbian
5. Presevo Valley, a regional home to Serbia’s largest ethnic Albanian minority, is situated in southern
Serbia bordering Macedonia to the south and Kosovo to the west. Of the approximately 86,000 inhabitants
of Presevo Valley, 89% are Albanian, yet ethnic Serbs dominate the public administration and security
institutions. See, B. Huszka, The Presevo Valley of Southern Serbian alongside Kosovo: The Case for
Decentralisation and Minority Protection. Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Policy Brief, No.
120. Brussels: CEPS, 2007.
6. S. Ramet, ‘‘The Denial Syndrome and its Consequences: Serbian Political Culture since 2000,’’
Comuninst and Post-Communist Studies 40, no. 1 (2007): 41–58. Retrieved from: doi: 10.1016/j.postcom-
stud.2006.12.004.
7. Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2009 (Berlin: Transparency Interna-
tional, 2009). Available from: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2009/gcb2009#dnld.
8. J. A. Gould and C. L. Sickner, ‘‘Making Market Democracies? The Contingent Loyalties of Post-
Privatization Elites in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Serbia,’’ Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 5
(2008): 740–769.
9. See A. Watkins, Security sector reform and donor assistance in Serbia 2000–2010 (Brussels: Ini-
tiative for Peacebuilding, 2010). Available from: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Serbia_
Report_Feb.pdf and National Security Strategy. Republic of Serbia (2009).
10. Radio Serbia (2010, 27 April). Ivanovic: Belgrade continues with pressure. Availabe from http://
glassrbije.org/E/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10715&Itemid=26: accessed 2 August 2010.
According to the Associated Press, Boris Tadic, current President of Serbia, recently stated ‘‘Serbia does not
recognize and will never recognize Kosovo.’’ Associated Press (April 8, 2010). ‘‘Serbia tells US it will never
recognize Kosovo.’’
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government reflects these political issues. The tension between external aspirations and
internal instability influences the proposed program budget reforms.
The Economic Climate for Program Budget Reform in Serbia
By 2000, due to multiple conflicts and economic sanctions, Serbian Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) had fallen by over 50% since 1989; inflation was over 100% per annum,
and external debt exceeded 130% of GDP.11 From this base, successive govern-
ments embarked on a path of economic reform that saw significant progress in economic
reconstruction through 2008.12 The global economic crisis, however, dramatically
affected economic growth in Serbia. GDP growth fell from 5.8% in 2008 to  2.8%
in 2009.13
A direct result of the financial crisis has been a decline in government revenues
and a corresponding increase in demand for social protection expenditures. The Serbian
government implemented, with the support of external donors, a policy program to
promote macroeconomic and financial stability. Specifically, the program attempted to
address the core problems facing the Serbian economy: low capacities to produce,
save, and export.14 For 2010, projections suggest a modest recovery with GDP growth
estimated to be approximately 2%. The government has continued to freeze nominal
public sector wages and salaries but has yet to shed a sizable amount of public sector
jobs that are widely seen as unproductive.15 The financial crisis also highlighted the need
for a sound and credible fiscal strategy, specifically by increasing public sector produc-
tivity and reducing ministerial budgets. These adjustments are likely to result in con-
tinued pressure to reduce defense expenditures, a fact noted by the Chief of the General
Staff in 2009.16
With respect to public financial management, the government has made significant ad-
vances since 2000. The Budget System Law (BSL) of 2002, along with recent amendments,
11. Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. Available from: http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd/en/
index.php: accessed 19 May 2010.
12. J. Litwack,and T. Price, (2003). OECD Economic Surveys: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia–Economic
Assessment, 2002(3), 1–181.
13. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Republic of Serbia: Stand-by arrangementFSecond review
mission, aide memoire, (2009). Available from: http://www.imf.org: accessed 2 August 2010, and S. Woe-
hrel, Serbia: Current issues and policy. Congressional Research Service Report 7-5700 RS22601 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010).
14. International Monetary Fund (IMF), IMF executive board concludes 2010 Article IV consultation
with Serbia. Public Information Notice (PIN), 10(47), (2010, 7 April). Available from: http://www.imf.org/
external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1047.htm: accessed 2 August 2010.
15. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Republic of Serbia: Staff report for the 2010 Article IV
Consultation: Third review under the stand-by arrangement and financing assurances review, 10(93), 2010.
Available from: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1093.pdf: accessed 2 August 2010.
16. A. Watkins, Security sector reform and donor assistance in Serbia 2000-2010. Initiative for Peace-
building, 2010. Available from: http://www.initativeforpeacebuilding.eu: accessed 2 August 2010.
McNab / Implementing Program Budgeting 121
has introduced a modern framework for public financial management.17 The fiscal roles
of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches are clearly defined in the constitution.
The Serbian MoF is piloting program budgeting in separate ministries, including the
MoD. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), however, noted analytical weaknesses
at the MoF and a lack of a comprehensive medium-term budgetary framework.18 While
the MoD has a strategic planning capability, the planning function has an implemen-
tation deficit; there is no explicit linkage to the resourcing process. Furthermore, while
the defense budget is available by economic classification, it is not publicly available
either by functional classification or by organization (military service), which decreases
defense expenditure accountability and transparency. These factors suggest that the en-
vironment is not as conducive for budget reform as one might desire; the paper later
addresses these concerns.
DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE PROGRAM STRUCTURE IN PRACTICE
While efforts to create a unified theory of public budgeting are more than likely to end in
failure, we can draw upon observed fact and practice, to identify important characteristics
of budgeting and budgets to construct applied theory.19 With respect to the implementation
of program budgeting in the Serbian MoD, the literature debates not only the efficacy of
program budgeting but also how the program structure should be built and whether pro-
gram budgeting implementation requires multiple budgets. The linkage between strategic
plans and programs through the program structure raises significant questions of who
should establish policy priorities: the president, parliament, or the ministries.20 This section
briefly reviews this debate and its application for the Serbian MoD.
Determining what constitutes program budgeting is an immediate problem.21 From
one perspective, program budgets more effectively align budget information with
17. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Republic of Serbia: Report on observance of standards and
codesFfiscal transparency module, 09(144), 2009. Available from: http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/
cr09144.pdf: accessed 2 August 2010.
18. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Republic of Serbia: Staff report for the 2010 Article IV
Consultation: Third review under the stand-by arrangement and financing assurances review, 10(93), 2010.
Available from: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1093.pdf: accessed 2 August 2010.
19. L. R. Jones and J. L. McCaffery, ‘‘Reform of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System, and
Management Control in the U.S. Department of Defense: Insights from Budget Theory,’’ Public Finance
and Management 25, no. 3 (2005): 1–19.
20. B. M. Gross, ‘‘PPBS Reexamined: The New Systems Budgeting,’’ Public Administration Review 29,
no. 2 (1969): 113–137; F. C. Mosher, ‘‘Limitations and Problems of PPBS in the States,’’ Public Admin-
istration Review 29, no. 2 (1969): 160–167; A. Schick, ‘‘A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal
PPB,’’ Public Administration Review 33, no. 2 (1973): 146–156; A. Wildavsky, ‘‘Rescuing Policy Analysis
from PPBS,’’ Public Administration Review 29, no. 2 (1969): 189–202.
21. See, for example, F.C. Mosher, Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice (New York: Public Ad-
ministration Service, 1954); and D. Novick, . Which program did we mean in ‘‘program budgeting’’
(Washington, D.C.: The RAND Corporation, 1954).
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strategic objectives and illustrate the consequences of budget decisions. By grouping line-
items that attempt to achieve the same strategic objective into programs, the focus of
senior decision makers moves from the narrow to the broad. Program budgets can thus
serve four distinct (and sometimes complementary) objectives by: (1) facilitating a cost-
effectiveness comparison between alternative systems; (2) improving technical efficiency
by providing discretionary authority to lower-level managers; (3) clarifying the life-cycle
costs of decisions; and (4) structuring planning, programming, and budgeting decisions
in a multi-year framework.22
Some critics, on the other hand, argue that program budgeting is a flawed concept that
cannot be effectively implemented in any setting. Attempts to create programs indepen-
dent of organizational affiliation are neither practical (as organizations typically receive
appropriations) nor possible (as bureaucrats typically focus on organizational issues). In
general, attempts to create and manage government-wide programs have ended in fail-
ure.23 The effort to implement the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS)
across the U.S. federal government is one example of the difficulty associated with
implementing program budgeting across organizations.24 Managers frequently resist
attempts to make programs independent from organizational affiliation, thereby break-
ing the linkage between administrative and programmatic structures. Many Latin
American countries, for example, have experimented (often with the assistance of the
U.S. Department of Defense) with implementing PPBS; these ventures have largely
ended in failure due to the lack of trained personnel, political stability, and the absence of
a credible commitment to budgetary reform.25
Program structure development thus has two distinct approaches. The first approach
argues that programmatic classification should reflect policy objectives across organi-
zational boundaries. The second argues that it should closely mirror the existing orga-
nizational structure. From the first perspective, the program structure should be the
dominant classification serving as the basis for policy decisions and resource allocations.
From the second view, conforming programs to existing institutional boundaries
22. J.M. Kim, (ed.) From Line-Item to Program Budgeting: Global lessons and the Korean Case (Seoul,
Korea: Korea Institute of Public Finance, 2007). Available from: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/
pe/bookprogrambudget.pdf.
23. The attempt to implement the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) across the U.S.
Federal government is one example of the difficulty of implementing program budgeting across organi-
zations. in Managing Public Expenditure: A Reference Book for Transition Countries. eds. R. Allen, and D.
Tommasi, (Paris, France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2001).
Available from: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/pe/oecdpemhandbook.pdf.
24. See, for example: S. Botner, ‘‘Four years of PPBS: An Appraisal,’’ Public Administration Review 30,
no. 4 (1970): 423–431 and A. Schick, ‘‘A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal PPB,’’ Public
Administration Review 33, no. 2 (1973): 146–156.
25. See, for example, H. Petrei, Budget and control reforming the public sector in Latin American
(Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1998); and A. Folscher, ‘‘Budget methods and
practices,’’ in Budgeting and budgetary institutions: Public sector governance and accountability series. ed. A.
Shah (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007. 109–136).
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simplifies the program structure and aligns it with organizational incentives. Each out-
look comes with a cost; for example, programs that span organizational boundaries have
proven difficult to implement. On the other hand, programs constrained within orga-
nizational boundaries diminish the government’s capacity to analyze and coordinate
objectives that two or more ministries might share.26 Others have argued that classifying
programs within organizations robs program budgeting of its essential purpose.27 Cu-
riously, advocates of both approaches argue that the resulting program structure rep-
resents policy objectives.
Recently, governments have begun to implement program budgeting based on the
recognition that an organization’s structure is a reflection of line ministries’ policy ob-
jectives.28 Several Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
members have reclassified their budgets on the basis of programmatic criteria and have
developed multi-year estimates for programs.29 This approach is important for transi-
tional countries as they typically encounter significantly greater difficulties in attempting
to implement program budgeting. The transition from line-item to program budgeting
requires a centralization of budget authority both in the line-ministries and at the MoF.
While inertia largely drove the previous incrementalist, input-oriented budget ap-
proach, program budgeting requires not only more staff, but also higher quality staff
given the need for intra and inter-program analysis.30 From the MoF’s perspective,
developing programs within ministries alleviates the burden of attempting to coordinate
programs across institutional boundaries.31 For line ministries, program budgeting re-
quires not only an increase in the numbers and capabilities of the budget staff but also
improved communication within the ministry. Without clear leadership, resourcing and
26. Y.D. Kim, W. Dorotinsky, F. Sarraf & A. Schick, Paths toward successful introduction of program
budgeting in Korea. in From Line-Item to Program Budgeting: Global lessons and the Korean Case. ed. J.M.
Kim (Seoul, Korea: Korea Institute of Public Finance, 2007, 23–134). Available from http://www1.world-
bank.org/publicsector/pe/bookprogrambudget.pdf.
27. A. Schick, ‘‘Performance Budgeting and Accrual Budgeting: Decision Rules or Analytic Tools,’’
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Journal on Budgeting 7, no. 2 (2007):
109–138.
28. D-J. Kraan, ‘‘Programme Budgeting in OECD Countries,’’ OECD Journal on Budgeting 7, no. 4
(2007): 1–41.
29. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Performance budgeting in
OECD countries (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007) and M. Robinson, Performance budgeting: Linking fund-
ing and results (United Kingdom: Palgrave, Macmillan, Houndmills, 2007).
30. For a discussion of implementing program budgeting and the need for institutional reform, see H.
van Eden, (2009, 28 August). Program budgeting without institutional reformFWhy it doesn’t work.
Public Financial Management Blog. International Monetary Fund (IMF). Available from: http://
blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2009/08/program-budgeting-without-institutional-reform-why-it-doesnt-work.html:
accessed 2 August 2010.
31. For a discussion of implementing program budgeting at the subnational level in the United States,
see, among others, C. Bourdeaux, ‘‘The Problem with Programs: Multiple Perspectives on Program Struc-
tures in Program-Based Performance-Oriented Budgets,’’ Public Budgeting & Finance 28, no. 2 (2008):
20–47.
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communication, the implementation of program budgeting is likely to meet significant
resistance at the line ministries. The next section examines the proposed budget reforms
in Serbia and discusses whether these reforms exhibit the desired characteristics of
design, consensus, and communication.32
IMPLEMENTING PROGRAM BUDGETING IN THE SERBIAN MOD
This section addresses a number of questions: What are the key ingredients for imple-
menting program budgeting in the Serbian MoD?33 Are the proposed reforms internally
consistent, comprehensive, and correctly sequenced? Does consensus exist for the proposed
program budgeting reforms? Finally, has the MoD senior leadership communicated the
need and the potential benefits of reform to the organization’s subordinate levels?
The Serbian military that emerged from the collapse of Yugoslavia inherited a force
structure designed to deter external aggression and to project force externally. In a
succession of wars with Croatia, Bosnia, and within Kosovo, the Serbian military em-
ployed armor, artillery, and other mechanized forces in an attempt to maintain its per-
ception of territorial integrity. Following the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo and
the fall of the Milosevic government in 2000, Serbia began downsizing its military in a
manner largely characterized by neglect; diminishing defense budgets led to equipment
deterioration and a decline in personnel skills. Today, the SAF continues to maintain an
armor-centric force of more than 200 tanks and numerous air superiority fighters.
The SAF, however, is attempting to shed the legacy of the Yugoslavian force structure.
Following the separation of Serbia and Montenegro, the SAF started transitioning towards
a joint force, similar to the Canadian Armed Forces. The SAF consists of three primary
branches: the Serbian Land Forces, the Serbian Air Force, and the Training Command.
The SAF’s formation of a Joint Forces Command34 (JFC) is an important component of
budget reform as the JFC is responsible for managing capabilities across the three branches.
A traditional, service-oriented budget structure would hinder the ability of the JFC and the
MoD to align resources with capabilities. The proposed implementation of program bud-
geting in the Serbian MoD offers an opportunity to complement the ongoing organiza-
tional reforms to improve coordination among the various branches.
Designing the Program Structure: For the MoD to adequately implement a multi-year,
program-oriented budget, its plans and programs should be linked to the strategic goals
outlined in the Serbian National Security Strategy (NSS) and Defense Strategy (DS).35
32. G. Koptis, ‘‘The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Central and Eastern Europe,’’ OECD
Journal on Budgeting 3 (2008): 1–11.
33. The author is aware over several technical assistance and consultative efforts with the Serbian MoD
in the area of budget reform, to include NATO, the United States, and Romania.
34. The Joint Forces Command stood up in 2007 and is intended to replace Land Forces Command.
35. The Serbian Parliament adopted the DS and NSS on October 26, 2009. Available from: http://
www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2009/10/27/nb-09: accessed 2
August 2010.
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The DS, for example, clearly states three strategic missions for the MoD: (1) defense of
the Republic of Serbia; (2) international military participation and cooperation; and (3)
support to civilian authorities.36 A priori the program structure should reflect these
strategic missions. To understand these strategic missions, what follows is a brief dis-
cussion on the security challenges illuminated in the NSS and DS.
First, the NSS and DS clearly state that the danger of armed external aggression is low,
suggesting that cross-border disputes are of decreased likelihood than in the past. On the
other hand, security concerns appear to be focused on the possibility of internal violence,
including the prospects of future violence resulting from the disputed independence of
Kosovo.37 Furthermore, there is an emphasis on other internal security challenges, to
include terrorism, extremism, and organized crime. The documents’ amplified concern for
internal security issues, coupled with the MoD’s desire to play a role in internal emergency
response, is tantamount to a dramatic shift in the Serbian MoD’s strategic mission set. With
the formation of the JFC and the transition to a joint force structure where each service
contributes to the three strategic missions, the program structure should be an implementing
mechanism for the joint force’s resources management.
Unfortunately, it appears that the Serbian MoD has confused the meaning of pro-
gram with that of organization. Common to many countries, roadblocks to program
budgeting often arise from a reluctance to reorient expenditures to an output- or out-
come-based classification and from an inability to understand what constitutes a pro-
gram. The current program structure of the Serbian MoD mirrors that of the
organizational structure: (1) land forces, (2) air forces and air defense; (3) training com-
mand; (4) central administration; and (5) general staff. While the proposed program
structure is comprehensive in its coverage of the entire MoD, the structure is neither
aligned with the MoD’s strategic missions nor amenable to strategic resources manage-
ment. The program structure design is not consistent with either view of program bud-
geting previously discussed in this paper. In fact, the structure replicates the existing
legacy budget structure and suggests the drive to implement program budgeting is not
aligned with best practices.
Are the reforms correctly sequenced? The current budget structure also suggests that
the Serbian MoD’s strategic planning function is not sufficiently developed to support
the implementation of program budgeting. First, given no true programs exist in the
Serbian MoD, plans remain focused on service-specific objectives rather than on the
desired capabilities or outcomes. Second, there does not appear to be a specific orga-
nization within the MoD responsible for the development and implementation of pro-
gram budgeting. This has led to decentralized efforts to design, develop, and implement
the proposed budget reforms. Discussions with representatives of the Serbian MoD and
36. The Government of the Republic of Serbia published the Defense Strategy in 2008 and the Serbian
Parliament approved it in 2009.
37. From a defense perspective, the Republic of Serbia considers Kosovo an internal security concern; it
is a matter of national policy that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia.
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SAF suggest that some, if not all, of the subordinate commands are developing their own
program structures. This may lead to the development of not one program structure, but
possibly up to five different structures, each at different stages of development.
The Serbian MoD is also constructing program elements, which would be necessary to
institute program budgeting. It appears that the major subordinate organizations (land
forces, air force and air defense, and training command) are responsible for identifying
and developing their respective program elements. Evidently, there is no central coor-
dinating function to ensure that the method of developing and using program elements is
consistent amongst the subordinate commands. While the MoD does publish budget
guidance, implementation remains the subordinate organization’s responsibility. The
Training Command, for example, has expended a significant amount of effort to catalog
existing units and processes in an attempt to develop program elements; they are ven-
turing to estimate the systems costs of developing program elements. Other commands,
however, do not appear to be following with a similar endeavor in terms of developing
program elements, suggesting a disparity of effort among the subordinate commands and
a lack of coordination by the MoD.
Performance indicators remain a challenge for the subordinate commands. Discussions
with international and Serbian MoD representatives revealed that almost all of the de-
velopment metrics are aligned with resource usage and inputs rather than activities, outputs,
or outcomes.38 As with program elements, there is significant variation in efforts to develop
these indicators; for example, some subordinate commands have developed hundreds of
potential indicators and others have not yet started the development process. The lack of a
central database of performance metrics casts doubt on the ability of senior leadership to
track resources and performance towards the strategic missions outlined in the DS.
As noted by Diamond, there is no point in designing and implementing a program if there
is a lack of data upon which to judge performance.39 As with the Serbian MoF, the Serbian
MoD appears to lacks the financial management infrastructure to implement a program
budgeting system. Although the existing financial system has the ability to track expenditures
down to the battalion level, there appears to be a lack of understanding on how to use the
current system to reorient expenditures to a programmatic presentation. Specifically, while
expenditure codes do exist, and are employed on a regular basis, the current program
structure, which is based on the organizational level, inhibited development of expenditure
object codes for a programmatic presentation. Simply put, since the organization and the
program are the same in the current system, the organizational view is the program view.
Sequencing is a significant issue for the Serbian MoD. The apparent lack of analytical
capability at the MoD to manage the program structure and resulting program elements
38. In discussions with representatives of the international community and the Serbian MoD, common
performance indicators include the cash received relative to the entire budget; personnel assigned relative to
the required number of personnel and equipment on hand relative to equipment required. There does not
appear to be an explicit linkage between these indicators and the goals of the organization.
39. Jack Diamond, From Program to Performance Budgeting: The Challenge for Emerging Market
Economies. IMF Working Paper WP/03/169, 2003.
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has created confusion at lower levels in the organization. The disparity of effort among the
major subordinate organizations suggests an uneven implementation of the program bud-
get reforms. The apparent rush to implement program budgeting has resulted in an attempt
to simultaneously develop the institutions and capabilities necessary for reform to succeed.
Is there consensus for the proposed reforms? If the program budgeting reform effort is
to succeed, there should be a modicum of institutional consensus on the need, direction,
and scope of reform. If executed correctly, program budgeting should shift the senior
decision maker’s focus to outputs and outcomes relative to the stated strategic missions
in the NSS and DS. Unfortunately, there appears to be significant resistance to the
proposed reforms.
Part of the reluctance to institute this change is also the potential transparency it
brings to the current force structure, relative to the strategic missions. Fiscal reform can
be hindered if one (or more) of the organizations involved view it as a zero-sum game. If
the NSS and DS establish, for example, that internal security missions are of relatively
high importance, this bodes poorly for the air force, which is still oriented to an air
superiority mission. One might expect the air force to view reform as producing an
unwanted outcome while the other organizations may view it as a potential gain. Clearly
such a game can lead to unwanted outcomes where the air force seeks to block reforms
that might, in the long run, benefit the organization as a whole. A programmatic pre-
sentation may also bolster arguments for a reduction in the size of the ground forces and
administration in support of civil support and special operations units. Given the MoD
employs approximately 30,000 military personnel and 10,000 civilians, such visibility
may threaten the existing allocation of resources, leading to bureaucratic resistance.
Has senior leadership communicated the need for reform? Another issue regarding the
resistance to reform is the absence of a change management program and a strategic
communications program. Bureaucratic resistance to implementing budget reforms is well
known, especially if reform is meant to produce significant winners (civil support and
special operations) and losers (air force). No clear rationale appears to exist for the pro-
posed reforms or for the desired outcomes associated with the reforms. This may be due to
the existing institutional culture that relies upon a top-down management style. While
previously such direction may have been possible, the democratic reforms currently un-
derway in Serbia require a more consensus-driven approach. Senior MoD management
does not appear to have clearly stated why budget reform is necessary, what benefits there
will be to the organization, or how the MoD will move forward with budget reform.
The somewhat chaotic nature of MoD’s implementation of program budgeting may
be attributed, in part, to a lack of leadership. Without a senior decision maker to
‘‘champion’’ the program budgeting effort, organizations define what constitutes pro-
gram budgeting to suit organizational culture and needs. An organization’s effort is
highly correlated with its technical expertise. It should be no surprise that Training
Command, with its specialized and well-educated staff, is the most open to change.
Training Command also may be a ‘‘winner’’ in reform, as it will need to produce more
skilled analysts capable of implementing program budgeting. The military services,
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on the other hand, are more resistant to change given that they may view reform as a
zero-sum game. Without a change management program and without sufficient com-
munication from senior leadership, the prospects for reform are dim.
THE TRANSITION TO PROGRAM BUDGETING IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
Given the current difficulties of the Serbian MoD with respect to the implementation of
program budgeting, we briefly turn to the comparative case of the Bosnian and Her-
zegovina MoD (BiH-MoD). The BiH MoD can serve as a model for the Serbian MoD as
the BiH MoD is in transition to a joint force and also continues to confront the legacies
of the civil war of the 1990s. The implementation of program budgeting is also relatively
recent, allowing the Serbian MoD to capitalize on the lessons learned of the BiH ex-
perience. While political and cultural constraints may inhibit the sharing of information
between the BiH MoD and Serbian MoD, the lessons are practical and directly appli-
cable to the effort in the Serbian MoD.
Unlike the Serbian MoD, the BiH MoD has, since 2005, worked to develop strategic
guidance for the implementation of defense policy and program budgeting. Starting with
the Law of Defense and the Law of Service in 2005, the BiH MoD developed a series of
strategic documents to communicate externally and internally the reform path for the
organization. Furthermore, the Ministry staff is responsible for updating these docu-
ments as part of a strategic planning cycle, avoiding the trap of many organizations of
issuing strategic guidance and then not updating it as conditions and policies change. We
thus observe the Security and Defense Policy (SDP) document being issued in 2006 and
updated in 2008, leading to the Defense Review and Modernization Plan (DRMP) and
the Defense Planning Policy (DPP) and Resource Management Policy (RMP) in 2009.40
From the perspective of program budgeting, the 2009 DPP is important as it explicitly
links the SDP to the RMP. The DPP contains, much like the U.S. Department of
Defense’s Strategic Planning Guidance, four sections linking policy to plans to resources:
(1) identification of risks, threats, and challenges; (2) defense capabilities; (3) tasks and
priorities; and (4) resources planning and programming. Simply put, the DPP is the
bridge between strategic planning and program budgeting in the BiH MoD.
From the DPP, the BiH MoD issued the Planning Programming Budgeting and
Execution Concept and Procedures document in 2009. There is thus, unlike in the Serb-
ian MoD, a clear communication of strategic intent through the BiH MoD on the
linkages between policies, plans, and programs. Furthermore, the MOD has centralized
authority away from the subordinate organizations with regards to the control of the
40. S. Cikotic´, (2010, 2 July). Minister of Defense, Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defense,
‘‘Strategic defense planning in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’’ Presentation to the Senior International Defense
Management Course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
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program budget system. The BiH MoD established four programs in 2009, organized by
the goals stated in the preceding policy and planning documents. These four programs
are: military defense, collective security operations, international cooperation, and ad-
ministration. The BiH MoD is responsible for assigning program managers and thus has
control over the implementation of program budgeting.
As the BiH MoD have stated their intent to transition to a joint force, the design of
the BiH MoD program structure appears to be more conducive to reform than that of
the Serbian MoD. First, senior level decision makers will have greater visibility on the
allocation of resources’ strategic goals. Second, within the Military Forces program,
decision makers can allocate resources across competing subprograms: land forces, air
forces, demining, and transition. This visibility is not available to Serbian MoD decision
makers due to the inherent flaws in the Serbian MoD program structure.
The BiH MoD transition is not without difficulties. Personnel expenditures account for
approximately 70% of total expenditures, limiting resources available for operations, pro-
curement, and institutional reform. A gap of approximately 0.5% of GDP exists between
the budget request and approved budget, further limiting the ability of the BiH MoD to
progress towards its strategic goals. Execution remains a concern to senior decision makers,
hence its inclusion in the design of the program budget system. Yet, Serbia shares similar
weaknesses and has not made as significant of process towards implementing program
budgeting. We believe that, even though there are significant historical issues between the
two countries, the BiH MoD has lessons to share with the Serbian MoD.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The MoD of the Republic of Serbia is attempting to pilot program budgeting in 2010. In its
current form, the proposed program budget system will not produce its intended outcomes
due to a flawed design, lack of consistency with best practice, and an absence of consensus
and communication as to the benefits of reform. These flaws are, sadly, not uncommon and
do not augur well for the implementation of program budgeting in the Serbian MoD.
The implementation of the proposed budget reforms should be halted at this point in
time. While this is a somewhat dramatic step given that the MoD has been actively
pursuing budget reform since 2003, and in earnest since 2008, the outcomes associated
with a flawed implementation are more significant. In the worst case, the MoD could
have a program structure for each subordinate organization with hundreds (if not
thousands) of ill-defined program elements. The likelihood of failure is quite significant;
a failure would impede future efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public
resources in the MoD.
The MoD is better off returning to the flawed foundation of the program budget system
to design a new program structure. Considering the guidance of the NSS and DS, the major
programs for the Serbian PPBE system might be: (1) territorial defense, (2) international
military cooperation, (3) support to civilian authorities, (4) training and logistics, and (5)
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central administration. Given the relative small size of the SAF, a large number of
programs are not necessary. An intelligence and surveillance program, for example, might
consist of two-to-three program elements and be too small to merit management at the
strategic level. Special operations, on the other hand, may warrant separation into a distinct
program due to its high visibility in the MoD and its unique mission set.
The MoD should develop a strategic change plan to inform the organization why reform
is necessary and how reform will produce a set of desired outcomes. The MoD must
communicate more effectively with its subordinate organizations, else it risks creating
another zero-sum game that leads to short-term resistance. If the MoD’s senior leadership
cannot effectively argue the why and the how of budget reform, then one should question
whether the time is appropriate for such institutional change in the MoD.
Finally, the MoD and its subordinate commands must institutionalize the proposed
budget reforms. The MoD, as discussed in this paper, does not have effective control
over the program structure, program elements, or performance indicators. If the senior
leadership believes that this environment will improve their management of the MoD’s
resources, they are mistaken. The MoD must, we believe, develop an analytical unit,
responsible to the Minster of Defense for the development and implementation of pro-
gram budgeting within the MoD. The MoD should also establish a process by which
individuals ascend to this new unit and obtain the requisite skills necessary to work
efficiently within the unit. As such, the MoD can turn to its international partners for
assistance in training and education. The MoD, however, cannot neglect the subordinate
commands in this process. If the subordinate commands do not have the institutional
capability to provide the information required for a program budget system to operate,
the reforms are likely to fail.
In conclusion, the Serbian MoD should pause in its efforts to implement program
budgeting due major flaws in the effort to date. Given Serbia’s regional importance and
its stated intent to reform the armed forces, the success of its program budgeting effort is
of concern. Failure would likely perpetuate the current force structure and inhibit cur-
rent efforts to create a joint force. Failure will also likely inhibit the Serbian Armed
Forces’ ability to provide increased support to their international partners and civil
authorities. These failures are likely to undermine Serbia’s participating in the NATO
PfP program, illustrating the linkage between program budget reform and the external
strategic objectives of the GoRS. The potential impact of a flawed budget reform in the
Serbian MoD is thus of concern to the domestic and international community.
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